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Introduction 
There is little doubt that framing processes play an important role in creating and sustaining social 
mobilization processes in the Middle East. More controversially, framing processes are also 
critical for sustaining organizational efficiency; when movements spawn formal organizations, 
those organizations will take advantage of some of the same processes used by mobilization 
leaders to shore up support from actors interested in seeing the organization achieve its goals. 
Moreover, when organizations find themselves in turbulent and problematic environments, they 
may shift their framing processes so as to cultivate new stakeholder relationships and broaden 
the base of those willing to provide material and moral support. Often, this will involve expanding 
the goals of the organization, providing existing members reason to support these new goals by 
developing a sense of shared responsibility for the fate of those affected by these new 
objectives—in short, by cultivating “surrogate consciousness” in their traditional membership. This 
process will influence the development of movements and their organizations and may increase 
the likelihood that a formal organization will develop in one way (for example, by choosing violent 
rather than nonviolent political engagement) rather than another. 
Such, we contend, has been the fate of Lebanon’s Hizballah. In this paper, we argue for a series 
of linked hypotheses.[1] First, we distinguish the concept of surrogate consciousness from related 
psychological processes involved in framing. Surrogate consciousness arises from the 
conjunction of empathetic responses with a ‘thin’ sense of shared identity (especially identities 
that arise from a recognition of common fate) even in the face of obvious and self-acknowledged 
out-group distinctions. Development of surrogate consciousness is enhanced by consideration of 
the narrative elements of the framing process. Second, by analyzing official documents of 
Hizballah and the rhetoric of Hizballah leaders such as Sheikh Hussein Nasrallah and Grand 
Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah—focusing in particular on how this ve rbiage has 
changed over time—we provide evidence that the Party of God has broadened its goals; this in 
turn has led to narrative efforts designed to boost surrogate consciousness in the Shi’a of 
Lebanon for the plight of Palestinians in the occupied territories. Third, and in the largest single 
section of our paper, we discuss potential trajectories Hizballah could follow as its development 
unfolds. Finally, we discuss actions the United States could take to make one trajectory rather 
than another more likely. We conclude by merging the two themes of our paper: while the United 
States can influence Hizballah’s trajectory, Hizballah’s cultivation of surrogate consciousness is a 
double-edged sword; on the one hand, it increases the chances Hizballah will continue to develop 
a bona fide constituency and moderate its goals. On the other hand, if Palestinians are unable to 
reach accommodation with Israel through non-violent means (such as the peace process), the 
surrogate consciousness could retrench Hizballah’s militant elements, which would not be a 
favorable development. Developmental trajectories and surrogate consciousness are thus 
intimately linked. 
We first elaborate and defend the idea of surrogate consciousness within the context of the 
framing literature. In general, mobilization (be it for peaceful or violent collective action) is thought 
to happen at the intersections of political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing 
processes.[2] There must be some form of political opportunity (or lack thereof)—for instance, a 
state crackdown on a spontaneous protest might open the political door for a full-fledged 
movement. Mobilizing structures provide resources for movements to grow and expand—for 
example, pre-existing social networks may serve as funnels for financial support for a nascent 
movement. Finally, framing processes can (among many other things) motivate individuals to join 
nascent movements, groups, and organizations, and may reinforce certain identities so as to 
make mobilization easier.[3] Critical to the importance of frames is the notion that they can 
resonate to greater or lesser degrees with target audiences.[4] 
Generally, social psychological facts (such as the development of group identity, or of awareness 
of one’s self as a part of a larger collective) are most likely to intervene upon the mobilization 
process via framing effects. Consider the idea of oppositional consciousness.[5] Oppositional 
consciousness is one process whereby members of a persecuted or oppressed group become 
aware of themselves as group members for the purposes of spurring action. Oppositional 
consciousness—“…an empowering mental state that prepares members of an oppressed group 
to act to undermine, reform or overthrow a system of human domination…”—involves, according 
to Jane Mansbridge, “…identifying with members of a subordinate group, identifying injustices 
done to that group, opposing these injustices, and seeing the group as having a shared interest in 
ending or diminishing those injustices.”[6] Framing will affect all these facets of oppositional 
consciousness. Justice frames, for example, will make salient to a group the injustices being 
done to them, while motivational frames will increase the likelihood a member of the affected 
group will take action to end the injustice. 
Surrogate consciousness is similar to, but separate from, oppositional consciousness. Like 
oppositional consciousness, surrogate consciousness will be affected by framing. It will involve 
some of the same processes as oppositional consciousness, and in many regards functions just 
as it does—to prepare members of a group for action. But unlike oppositional consciousness, 
surrogate consciousness involves action by members of an out-group on behalf of another group 
that is being prosecuted. Oppositional consciousness involves the development of empathy, but 
such empathy is shared only with in-group members (indeed, this is what makes it oppositional 
rather than merely generally empathetic). In the case of surrogate consciousness, however, 
empathy is developed for another group even when one recognizes that one is not in fact a 
member of that group. 
To summarize, according to our nascent theory, surrogate consciousness arises from the 
conjunction of empathetic responses with a very shallow sense of shared identity (especially 
identities that arise from recognition of common fate, which is probably the identity generating 
mechanism which generates the thinnest, most violable sense of identity[7]) whilst nonetheless 
recognizing the existence of obvious out-group distinctions.[8] Some homely empirical examples 
may help. John notices that African-Americans are being subtly discriminated against in his 
neighborhood; despite the fact that he is Caucasian he nonetheless acts on behalf of the African-
American community by attending civil rights parades and donating money to the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, perhaps in part because he fears that he—
as a member of a minority religion (let’s stipulate that he’s a practicing Seventh Day Adventist)—
may eventually face the same persecution.[9] This would be a classic case of acting out of 
surrogate consciousness. 
The task for the next section of this paper, then, will be to demonstrate that Hizballah has used 
different framing devices in their rhetoric in an attempt to develop surrogate consciousness in 
their traditional constituency for the purposes of expanding their base. Perhaps they hope to 
eventually be able to appeal to the members of the group on whose behalf they have developed 
surrogacy. The group in whom surrogate consciousness is being developed includes the 
traditional subjects of Hizballah: the people of occupied southern Lebanon, especially Shi’a. The 
group on whose behalf the consciousness is being developed includes Palestinians living in the 
occupied territories. Part of the reason why Hizballah is taking this action was to prepare the way 
for being acknowledged as a legitimate actor, not just in the Lebanese political scene but also in 
the larger Southwest Asian political arena, and not just for Shi’a, but for all groups that have faced 
injustice in the region. Or so we hope to demonstrate in the next section. 
For reasons of space, we will not review Hizballah’s history here; suffice it to say that the 
organization’s goals have broadened as time has passed since its militant founding in 1985 in 
response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, becoming more politically realistic; and 
second, that Hizballah has developed a bona fide political constituency, whom they represent 
both in the Lebanese parliament and regionally. These modifications have required Hizballah to 
broaden their base, which in time has led to the articulation of a new narrative designed to 
generate surrogate consciousness.[10] 
Consider first an interview with Fadlallah (the spiritual leader for Hizballah) from a 1987 issue of 
the Journal of Palestine Studies; in the interview, Fadlallah discusses the tensions between 
Palestinians and Shi’a in Southern Lebanon in the early 1980s, openly acknowledging that 
“…there was political, material, and spiritual weariness; and chaos dominated the south as a 
result of the disorderly Palestinian political expansion which interfered both in the internal struggle 
between political parties and in family matters…”.[11] This was in response to a question from the 
Journal regarding why it was that some Shi’a in the south apparently viewed the Israel arrival in a 
positive light. While disputing that all Shi’a felt this way, Fadlallah nonetheless acknowledges that 
the “…Palestinians were expanding in a disturbing way…”[12] and that it is in the nature of some 
regional actors to “score points”[13] against its rivals in Palestinian-Arab political disputes by 
turning a blind eye to actions they would otherwise condemn (e.g., the Israeli invasion of 
Southern Lebanon).  
Later, Fadlallah is even more explicit that he believes “…that the Arab political scene, and 
particularly the Lebanese scene, is moving to free itself from the burden of the Palestine 
problem.”[14] While Fadlallah discusses in this interview that Hizballah has goals that include the 
essential elimination of Israel as a political force, and uses this to distinguish Hizballah from Amal 
(which had more limited goals of freeing Southern Lebanon from Israeli occupation), he 
nonetheless is careful to disentangle Hizballah from direct connection to the Palestinian cause as 
such.  
Considerations like this place Hizballah in a bind. On the one hand, the fact that Israel actually 
completed their withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 gave Hizballah enormous prestige, as 
Hizballah’s resistance had arguably led to the first successful case of resistance against Israeli 
territorial aggression in the region. On the other hand, this also meant that Hizballah had to find 
other goals to justify its continued existence as a regional political actor; this was complicated by 
the fact that their provision of social services, education, and medical care had broadened 
Hizballah’s base and contributed to their emergence as a political force in Lebanon, replete with 
explicit representative duties. One media organ Hizballah has used to cultivate surrogate 
consciousness so as to consolidate these political developments is their television station.  
In 1991, Hizballah founded their television station, al-Manar (“the Lighthouse”). Al-Manar is 
extremely popular regionally, ranking second only to Al-Jazeera in popularity in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip.[15] Al-Manar broadcasts numerous motivational videos with stirring slogans and 
professionally produced graphics and music. These polemic videos serve several purposes, one 
of which, we contend, is the facilitation of surrogate consciousness for the Palestinian plight in 
Lebanese viewers. Al-Manar station manager Nayef Krayem says as much, stating that the 
station has links to multiple militant Palestinian groups (including the military wing of Fatah’s Abu 
Musa faction and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades), and that part of the station’s mission is to 
generate material and moral support for the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation.[16] 
Hizballah deputy secretary-general Sheikh Naim Qassam told Lebanese Future Television that 
Hizballah provides “…national support to the Palestinians through al-Manar television,”[17] and 
Hussein Nasrallah’s rhetoric in multiple venues has included consciousness raising on behalf of 
the Palestinian struggle.[18]  
Consider, for example, a video broadcast which includes images of a suicide bomber destroying 
an Israeli checkpoint; or in another case, a video shows footage of Israeli bulldozers knocking 
down Palestinian dwellings. A third video details Palestinian suicide bombers who have died 
while killing IDF members. These videos emphasize the themes that would need to be developed 
if surrogate consciousness were to appear. Recall that (in the case of the development of related 
oppositional consciousness) the group would need to become aware of injustices, identify with 
the group being repressed, and feel the need to redress the injustices; in the case of surrogate 
consciousness, feeling of group belonging does not need to be present, or if it is present it is 
sustained only by common fate considerations and will also probably involve recognition that one 
is not actually a member of the surrogate group. Videos like these lay the groundwork for all 
these things by raising awareness of injustices done to the Palestinians, by providing a means of 
redressing them (al-Manar broadcasts bank account information for those who wish to donate to 
organizations which support violent action in response, and also provides sometime material and 
moral support to Palestinian organizations such as Hamas), and by laying the emotional 
groundwork for support for things like the second Intifada via the use of resonant music and 
emotion-laden images.[19]  
One objection is that to assume any particular broadcasts reflect shifts in strategic goals of 
Hizballah would be unjustified; this is probably the case. For instance, there are links between 
themes emphasized in al-Manar programming and short-term political goals related to the 
Lebanese elections. Consider, for instance, the period between May and September 2000, in 
which the tone and content shifted to emphasize the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, Hizballah’s 
successful military campaign, and Israeli military weaknesses. The “triumph over Israel ” theme 
was probably related not just to facts on the ground about the Israeli/Lebanon situation but also to 
the upcoming September 2000 Lebanese parliamentary elections.[20] Even so, the shift in tone 
and content about the Palestinian plight has sustained itself for long enough that the conclusion 
that this change from the attitude of practiced distant concern of the mid-80’s is more than a 
tactical political development has first-pass plausibility. It passes the sniff test.  
Discussion of Hizballah’s broadened goals and attempts to develop surrogate consciousness 
naturally lead to larger considerations regarding Hizballah’s general developmental trajectory. We 
discuss these possibilities in the next section as a prelude to discussing policy options for the 
United States, before finally tying them together explicitly in our concluding section. 
Scenario One—Retrenchment:  
In this scenario Hizballah remains a terrorist group with both an active military and political wing. 
It continues to provide social services in accordance with its religious precepts and provides for 
military defense along the Israeli/Lebanese border. With its ongoing international support, 
Hizballah “ could encourage increased attacks in Israel and the Palestinian Territories to derail 
progress toward peace.”[21] It is supported by a global financial, but not necessarily operational, 
network. Hizballah’s goals and actions remain a serious threat to the security of the Middle East. 
It continues to call for the destruction of Israel and continues to use Lebanese territory as a 
staging ground for terrorist operations. It provides material support to Palestinian terrorist groups 
and enhances their capability to attack Israel and derail the peace process. The one way to 
maintain its continued existence is to keep the Lebanon-Israel conflict simmering to ensure 
Palestine and Israeli do not come to a long-term agreement. 
Already Hizballah has accomplished keeping the conflict alive by pressing additional territorial 
claims after the IDF withdrawal. These claims focus on territory beyond the internationally-
recognized Lebanese border, creating a dispute over a small piece of territory called Sheba’a 
Farms. It is situated where south Lebanon borders the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and 
consists of between twenty-five and one hundred square kilometers. This rural area has been 
internationally recognized as part of Syria not Lebanon. The UN resolved that “as of 16 June 
2000, Israel had withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with Resolution 425.”[22] 
However, this force withdrawal is contested by Hizballah, the Lebanese government, and the 
Syrian government. All three claim the Sheba’a Farms had been transferred from Syria to 
Lebanon although there are no official international records which reflect this transaction. This 
situation has resulted in violent disregard for the Blue Line by both sides which recently resulted 
in the death of a French UN peacekeeper. Exacerbating the situation is the non-intervention by 
the Lebanese government forces which resulted in the UN extending the United Nations Interim 
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mandate until July 2005.  
Hizballah has also adopted a Palestinianization of its goals, as discussed earlier. Since Aug 2000, 
Hizballah is reemphasizing its mission to liberate Palestine.[23] With this in mind, it attempts to 
violently derail the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Indeed, after the peaceful election of 
Mahmoud Abbas as the Palestinian Authority (PA) Prime Minister, there was an informal PA-
Israeli cease-fire enacted. Continued conflict allows Hizballah to continue to demonstrate it is 
“fighting for justice in Palestine” and claim the mantle of the only force to defeat Israel. If the 
conflict ends, Hizballah loses this Islamic warrior status and prestige. This is a paradoxical 
position because the PA, on whose behalf Hizballah is operating, immediately and strongly 
denounced continued attacks. 
Politically, Hizballah will remain a religiously conservative and militant force for some time to 
come. The internal elections held in 2001 saw conservatives reassert power over reformists, 
liberal laymen, and members of parliament. This move severely restricted the party shifting 
decision-making power in favor of former resistance fighters.[24]  
Internationally, Iran benefits by a continuing violent Hizballah because it provides Iran with a 
potent proxy force to keep regional conflict simmering. So long as Israel and the PA do not come 
to any meaningful and lasting agreements, Iran will use the conflict to demonstrate the evil 
“Zionist entity” and its “Great Satin” supporters have regional designs on all Muslim lands. This 
outwardly focused rhetoric helps deflect such questions of the legitimacy of their Mullah-based 
theocracy, lack of democratic foundations in Iranian elections, and the Iranian nuclear weapons 
issue. Likewise, a continuingly violent Hizballah also benefits Syria keeping regional tensions high 
allowing Syria to retain its “frontline state” status after its defeat in the 1967 War. Continued 
Hizballah violence keeps the issue of Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights in the public view 
and politically weakens Israel. With Egypt and Jordan having long since normalized relations with 
Israeli, a peaceful Palestine and Lebanon would leave Syria standing alone as the sole remaining 
Arab state to continue its hard-line stance. 
Scenario Two—Radicalization:  
In this second trajectory, Hizballah could become a full-blown international terrorist group on the 
model of al Qaeda. This scenario is not out of the realm of possibility as some believe Hizballah 
already “operates worldwide and has an estimated annual budget of $500 million…and reserves 
are greater than bin Laden’s fortune.”[25] Like Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, Hizballah hosts 
and trains terrorist from a variety of doctrinally heterogeneous groups at its camps in the Syrian-
protected Beka’a Valley. But “unlike al Qaeda…Hizballah has combined terror with a quasi-state 
in being.”[26] Thus, Hizballah can leverage its current position as master and primary social 
service provider of this weak quasi-state in southern Lebanon to train terrorists in safety and 
security with the goal of exporting terror. This presents a very dangerous situation as “it is not 
failed states, but week quasi-states which provide the most dangerous safe havens for 
international terrorism.”[27] The legitimate Lebanese government, unwilling or unable to control 
the regions, provides the perfect diplomatic cover for expanded terrorist operations.  
Hizballah enjoys international support from Syria and Iran and its international financial 
operations have branched out into criminal activities into the lawless "tri-border" region of South 
America. The group has even maintained a fundraising presence in the United States since the 
1980s.”[28] In his 24 Feb 2004 testimony before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, CIA 
Director George Tenet stated cautioned Hizballah now has a an extensive network in America 
and that " Lebanese Hizballahcooperates with (international terrorist) groups and appears to be 
increasing its support.” Thus, Hizballah could make the transition from its current regionally-
focused Lebanese operations to international terror with relative ease. Hizballah has already 
conducted terrorist bombings outside the Middle East as they were responsible for the 1992 
Israeli Embassy bombing and bombing of a Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires. 
Scenario Three—Transformation:  
There is historical precedence of former opposition groups, when presented with the opportunity 
to compete in the political process transformed into a solely political party.[29] In this scenario, 
Hizballah transitions from a mature terrorist group into a strong Shia’ia Islamic political party. 
Although heavily influenced by Syrian political and military pressures and classified by Freedom 
House’s 2003 survey as “Not Free,”[30] Lebanon has the potential for a democratizing transition. 
Many Lebanese would welcome a demobilized Hizballah, as “many are wary of the organization 
dragging the country into another war.”[31] In the 1992 parliamentary elections, eight Hizballah 
members won seats under the “Loyalty to the Resistance” slogan.[32] The group’s “One 
Lebanon” platform encourages the preservation of a Muslim and Arab cultural identity and a 
dedication to the eradication of foreign occupation. As of the 2002 elections, Hezbollah holds 
twelve seats in the parliament. 
Many Lebanese would welcome a demobilized Hizballah. War-weary form the protracted conflict, 
“many are wary of the organization dragging the country into another war.”[33] Political inclusion 
has demonstrated a moderating effect on Hizballah.”[34] The military victory is not an automatic 
ticket to political power and “Hizballah’s victory will not long inspire electoral loyalty.”[35] It must 
demonstrate the ability to politically organize and produce a workable vision and plan for the 
future of Lebanon.  
The danger of, “one-man, one-vote, one-time,” or a theocratic takeover is overstated given 
Lebanon’s diversified population demographics and established political preferences. The Shi’a 
would not win a clear majority even if all voted as a homogeneous block—which they do not. 
Instead they are divided between Hizballah, Amal and the Syrian Social National parties as well 
as some Shi’ites voting for Christian candidates.[36] In addition, “the overwhelming majority of 
Hizballah adherents along with Shi'a in general prefer a Western political system (modeled on 
Switzerland or the United States), not a theocratic one.”[37]  
These three trajectories represent the most likely, the worst, and the best possible outcomes in 
terms of past performance and peace and stability. Examining these trajectories raises the 
question of what can be done to channel this militant organization into a peaceful political party. 
The United States has a significant national interest in which Hizballah’s trajectory. But the United 
States is not a passive actor on which this international program plays out. It has significant 
military power, economic and social resources, and political influence which can be employed. 
The overriding requirement is to define our goals—what effect do we want and what endstate 
conditions will meet this goal? The United States should then use all the dimensions of its 
national power to assist the development of a peaceful and prosperous Lebanon. Ideally, this 
process should be done using the nascent Lebanese democracy to foster a politically mobilized 
Hizballah, which continues to provide social service, but without an active military wing. This 
endstate disarms a potentially destructive international foe while it produces a productive national 
trading partner.  
What should the United States do to assist Lebanon’s development and demobilize Hizballah’s 
militia? At the group level of analysis, Hizballah has a number of inputs, processes, and outputs 
which may be influenced to bring about the desired endstate. The military, political, socio-
economic, and international dimensions of its character may be vulnerable to influence. However, 
“social targeting” should be seen as a shaping and influence operation. It is neither deterministic 
nor fatalistic, there is no one-to-one correlation between actions and desired responses. It is also 
important to note that our actions do incite responses. If the United States desires a demobilized 
Hizballah, it must act with the knowledge that actions can aid or hinder the outcome. 
1. Solve Sheba’a Farms Dispute:  
The militarily-charged situation which gave birth of Hizballah has changed and is no longer a 
stable source of motivation. In the 1980s, Hizballah’s overriding reason for being has been its 
resistance to Israeli occupation. This motivation largely ended in May 2000, with the IDF 
withdrawing from Lebanon. Resolving the Sheba’a Farms dispute will remove the last significant 
Israeli presence in disputed Lebanese territory. Israeli Prime Minister Sharon had expressed an 
interest in unilaterally withdrawing from Sheba’a Farms if it would have ended the conflict[38] and 
a pull-back is in Israeli’s self-interest. There are no Israeli settlers living in the area, no religious-
based attachment and no long-term objectives there. Pulling back would only have the effect of 
transforming occupied Syrians into Lebanese and both states desire the change. Israel would be 
pulling back from a frontier position into another further up in the foothills of the occupied Golan 
Heights with no loss of military advantage. The political gain for demonstrating Israel’s desire to 
seek peace would be significant. With the currently changing political winds, this move might 
provide international pressure on the Lebanese government to disarm and disband Hizballah’s 
military wing. To this end, the United States should encourage the Sharon government to 
announce its intention to withdraw.  
2. Physically Separate Hizballah and the IDF:  
The next major military goal should be to physically separate Hizballah’s armed militias from 
positions along the Israeli/occupied territory border. As a confidence building step, the unarmed 
UN peacekeeping force will continue to patrol the contested borders. For long-term peace, the 
belligerent forces will need to be withdrawn. Previously, the Lebanese government has been 
unable to project a capable force able to defend its borders. In order to assume the role of central 
government, Lebanon must field a more capable military and exert a monopoly on the use of 
violence within its borders.  
3. Disarm Hizballah’s Military Wing:  
In conjunction with building of a viable Lebanese Army, the Hizballah’s militia should be disarmed 
and disbanded. This is contained in UNSC resolution 1559 which not only requires Syrian force 
withdrawal, but also calls for the disarming and dissolution of all armed militia forces within 
Lebanon. Hizballah’s weapons should be turned over to the central government and those 
wishing to remain in uniform absorbed, as individuals, into the Lebanese army. Those not wishing 
to remain under arms should be assisted in finding gainful employment in the civilian economy.  
4. Stabilize Lebanon:  
Another process for transforming Hizballah is to reinforce a stable Lebanese state. This should be 
done on a broad-front encompassing political and economic assistance. The stronger and more 
politically inclusive the state the less useful militancy will become. As the state gains capacity, it 
should assess its ability to reinsert itself into providing social services in Shi’a areas. Through 
economies of scale, a state can accomplish this more efficiently than NGOs or social 
movements,[39] and the result would be a stronger state structure. 
5. UN Peacekeepers to Facilitate Syrian Withdrawal:  
To fill help fill a potentially dangerous void left after a Syrian withdrawal and Hizballah 
demobilization, a UN peacekeeping and stabilization force should be deployed to southern 
Lebanon and the Beka’a Valley. The current UNIFIL force is unarmed and incapable of 
performing in this role.[40][41]  
6. Solve Israeli-Palestinian Conflict:  
The next major category of subtask is to resolve Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The U.S. government 
is committed to that end as “ America stands committed to an independent and democratic 
Palestine, living beside Israel in peace and security.”[42] With the election of Mahmud Abbas as 
the PA Prime Minister, there seems to be a window of opportunity to achieve this exceptionally 
elusive goal. The rewards for an enduring peace are immeasurable. To accomplish this, PA and 
Israeli moderates will need political support and material assistance. Th e PA will need to gain the 
confidence and support of the Palestinian people and gain the strength to negate Hamas or 
Hizballah. Iran has pledged to stand by any Palestinian peace which is acceptable to the 
Palestinian people. If that is true, Hizballah support should dry-up with an accepted Israeli-
Palestinian peace accord.  
7. Foster Political Institutions:  
Another major area for western influence is in helping to foster political transparency and 
inclusion through democratic institutions in Lebanon. This can be accomplished through 
routinized political competition within Lebanon and institutionalized power sharing. With United 
States support, the United Nations should take the lead in this effort. 
8. Avoid Pretexts for Continued Militancy:  
Hizballah’s central framing, source of legitimacy, and elevated status are centered on its success 
as a resistance group against the Israelis. In addition to the Sheba’a Farms dispute and the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, over-flights by the Israeli Air Force are a visible, if only 
symbolic, incursion into Lebanon. These flights should be discontinued as they provide little 
military value and are counter-productive in demobilizing Hizballah. The Hizballah response to 
these symbolic attacks is to fire anti-aircraft artillery over the Blue Line where the fused munitions 
explode over Israeli settlements.[43] This tit-for-tat exchange only serves to raise tensions with 
little substantial to show for the effort. 
9. Do Not Ignore Hizballah:  
The United States should not assume, “if we ignore it, it will go away.” Benign neglect of post-
Soviet Afghanistan has provided a painful lesson concerning the susceptibilities of a weak state 
partially run by well-financed terrorist organizations. Indeed, “failure to deal with the real and 
immediate threat Hizballah poses today will have severe and painful consequences for the 
future.”[44] 
10. Beware the Military Option:  
The United States should not exert direct military influence. Hizballah enjoys popularity beyond 
the Shi’a and the United States would be hard pressed to find local allies beyond the Marionite 
Christians. Hizballah members do not stand out physically from the local population like al Qaeda 
in Afghanistan. Hizballah militias are well-practiced in insurgency and the price for a military 
expedition would probably be high.[45] Instead, the United States should encourage the current 
pro-democracy/anti-Syrian unrest to play out. The coercive framework is in place—coalition 
forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S. Navy patrolling the Persian Gulf and a strong alliance with 
Israel all represent potent and immediate threats to Iran, Syria and Hizballah. For the time being, 
this commitment is sufficient. Given Hizballah’s multifaceted nature, and barring a spectacular 
terrorist attack on the United States, it is unlikely there would be world support for such an attack. 
Further, even if the United States successfully occupies southern Lebanon, the result would force 
Hizballah to re-energize its suicide terrorism campaign against U.S. occupying forces as they had 
with the Israelis or, leveraging its global network, react with bombings elsewhere.  
Finally, direct military engagement would probably end badly. Direct Israeli intervention has 
proven largely counterproductive as well serving only to increase anti-Israeli sentiments. 
Operation Accountability in 1993 and Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996 are two cases in point. 
During these operations, Israel launched massive attacks aimed at “wiping out Hizballah terrorist 
bases,”[46] claiming that the air strikes were retaliatory in nature. The Israeli goal was to sour 
Hizballah support. Operation Grapes of Wrath killed thirteen Hizballah fighters and many more 
Lebanese civilians while also failing to destroy any Katyusha rockets.[47] Operation 
Accountability killed many more civilians and caused 200,000 refugees to flee from their homes in 
southern Lebanon.[48] Instead of reducing Hizballah’s support, these efforts greatly increased 
support for the resistance. In addition, Hizballah’s resisting these attacks provided additional 
motivation for Hamas and Islamic Jihad to take up the fight in the Gaza Strip and Golan Heights. 
11. Beware of the Financial Weapon:  
The United States has labeled Hizballah a terrorist organization and placed them on the Foreign 
Terrorist Organization (FTO) list. By default, this brings a number of reactions not the least of 
which is freezing of financial assets. However, financial actions are an indiscriminate weapon. By 
cutting off finances for terrorism, it also cuts off sources of funding for social welfare services as 
well weakening those civil institutions we want to foster.  
Conclusion 
Now that we’ve examined potential developmental trajectories for Hizballah and the upshot this 
has for U.S. policy, we can tie the trajectories explicitly to our theoretical framework of surrogate 
consciousness. Whether the development of surrogate consciousness is positive remains an 
open question; on the one hand, it increases the chances Hizballah will continue to develop a 
bona fide constituency and moderate its goals so they become irredentist rather than millenarian, 
making it all the more likely those goals can be achieved by peaceful political means. This may 
have the pleasant upshot of marginalizing the militant wing of Hizballah. As Baylouny points out in 
her Strategic Insight  “Democratic Inclusion: A Solution to Militancy in Islamic Movements?”[49] 
involvement in democratic institutions has a moderating influence even on those who have anti-
system goals. Cultivation of a bona fide constituency tends to decrease the likelihood of violent 
political action, as such cultivation usually involves the formation of moderate organizations and 
institutions designed to minister to the needs of this constituency. In other words, surrogate 
consciousness could make the third possible trajectory—transformation—all the more likely.  
On the other hand, if Palestinians are unable to reach accommodation with Israel through non-
violent means (e.g., via the resurgent peace process), the development of surrogate 
consciousness could retrench Hizballah’s militant elements, which would not be a favorable 
development.[50] In that case, scenarios one or two become more likely. Developing surrogate 
consciousness boosts the complexity and interconnectedness of the system; from a policy-
making perspective, this can be both a good and bad thing, contingent upon how the system as a 
whole develops.  
In this paper, we argued for a series of hypotheses. First, we distinguished the concept of 
surrogate consciousness from related psychological processes involved in framing. Surrogate 
consciousness arises from the conjunction of empathetic responses with a ‘thin’ sense of shared 
identity even in the face of obvious and self-acknowledged out -group distinctions; it can play a 
critical role in broadening an organization’s base of support. Second, by analyzing official 
documents of Hizballah and the rhetoric of Hizballah leaders such as Nasrallah and Fadlallah and 
the al-Manar television station, we provided (admittedly slim) evidence that the Party of God has 
broadened its goals and that this in turn has led to narrative efforts designed to boost surrogate 
consciousness in the Shi’a of Lebanon for the plight of Palestinians in the occupied territories. 
Third, and more widely, we considered the possible developmental trajectories of Hizballah and 
discussed how the United States can shape the environment so as to make transformation the 
most likely outcome. Finally, and most briefly, we linked developmental trajectory to surrogate 
consciousness, arguing that it’s creation contributes to Hizballah’s maintenance of a constituency, 
which is a net positive, but could also lead to identification with militant means of resolving 
disputes should the latest incarnation of the Palestinian/Israeli peace process fail. Irrespective of 
how political events in the Middle East shape—and are shaped by—Hizballah in the future, we 
hope to have driven home the importance of understanding the rhetorical and narrative “top 
cover” movements and organizations use; only by engaging in this endeavor in subtle (and 
sympathetic) ways can we hope to shift the story-telling atmosphere in such a manner that 
peaceful resolutions to political conflict become the norm in the region. 
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